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The study investigates how complacency and automation bias effects in interaction with 
automated aids are moderated by system experience. Participants performed a supervisory control 
task supported by an aid for fault identification and management. Groups differed with respect to 
how long they worked with the aid until eventually an automation failure occurred, and whether 
this failure was the first or second one the participants were exposed to. Results show that negative 
experiences, i.e., automation failures, entail stronger effects on subjective trust in automation as 
well as the level of complacency and automation bias than positive experiences (correct 
recommendations of the aid). Furthermore, results suggest that commission errors may be due to 
three different sorts of effects: (1) a withdrawal of attention in terms of incomplete cross-checks of 
information, (2) an active discounting of contradictory system information, and (3) an inattentive 
processing of contradictory information analogue to a “looking-but-not-seeing” effect. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Human interaction with automated systems often 
involves the risk of misuse of automation, i.e. an uncritical 
reliance on its proper functioning (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). One important aspect of automation misuse is reflected 
in an insufficient monitoring or checking of automated 
functions, a phenomenon which commonly has been referred 
to as complacency (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993). 
Originally complacency has been identified as an issue in 
supervisory control of autonomous processes. A typical 
example involves pilots who rely on the proper functioning of 
their autopilot so much that they neglect to monitor and check 
it appropriately. Important performance consequences of 
complacency may include a loss of situational awareness and 
an elevated risk of missing automation failures. 
However, complacency-like effects can emerge in 
other fields of human-automation interaction as well. For 
example, Mosier & Skitka (1996) have introduced the concept 
of automation bias. They argue that decision aids may be 
misused by taking their outcome “…as a heuristic replacement 
for vigilant information seeking and processing” (p. 205). One 
kind of error resulting from this effect includes commission 
errors where an operator follows an aid’s advice even though 
it is wrong. According to Skitka, Mosier & Burdick (1999), 
‘‘commission errors can be the result of not seeking out 
confirmatory or disconfirmatory information, or discounting 
other sources of information in the presence of computer-
generated cues’’ (p. 993). The latter alternative reflects a 
decision bias in a strict sense. However, the former alternative, 
i.e., following the aid’s recommendation without verification, 
seems to reflect a decision bias effect which, on a behavioral 
level, involves a withdrawal of attention that resembles 
complacency effects in supervisory control. 
Empirical evidence for a link between complacency 
and automation bias has been provided by a recent set of 
studies (Bahner, Hueper & Manzey, 2008; Bahner, Elepfandt 
& Manzey, 2008; Manzey, Reichenbach & Onnasch, 2008). In 
these studies, the participants had to perform a supervisory 
control task which required them to monitor an autonomously 
running life support system and to intervene whenever they 
detected a system fault. This task was supported by an 
automated aid. In case of system faults it provided the human 
operator with an automatically generated diagnosis and 
recommendations for fault management. Complacency in 
interaction with this aid was operationally defined by the 
extent to which the operators cross-checked the automatically 
generated diagnoses before they accepted it and intervened in 
the system. Between 20% and 75% of the participants in these 
studies were found to commit a commission error when the 
aid, after some time of proper functioning, surprisingly 
provided a wrong diagnosis. Detailed analyses of the 
information sampling behavior revealed that these operators 
showed a higher level of complacency in their interaction with 
the aid than those who detected the failure of the aid. 
However, not all of the commission errors could be related to 
an obvious complacency effect. Up to 50% of the participants 
committing a commission error followed the aid’s wrong 
advice despite seeking out all system information needed to 
detect that the aid’s advice was wrong.  
The current study capitalizes on this research. Using 
the same experimental paradigm as in the research referred to 
above, it is explored to what extent positive and negative 
experiences with an automated aid play together in 
determining the level of trust, complacency and strength of 
automation bias. It is assumed that two feedback loops need to 
be considered in this respect. The first one represents a 
positive loop which is triggered by the experience that the 
automation provides a valid advice. Repeated experience of 
this kind will successively increase the trust in the system and 
eventually lead to a reduction of effort invested in cross-
checks and automation verification. If this effort reduction 
does not yield any negative performance consequences (which 
is the more likely the more reliably the aid works) it might get 
reinforced and result in a self-amplifying process which 
continuously increases the level of complacency and 
automation bias (cf. the similar concept of “learned 
carelessness”; Luedtke & Moebus, 2004). However, a reverse 
effect is assumed to result from a concurrent negative 
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 feedback loop which is mainly triggered by experience of 
automation failures. This is suggested by findings showing 
that even the experience of a single automation failure can 
considerably reduce the trust of operators in a given system 
(Lee & Moray, 1992). For example, after the experience of 
failures during training operators are less complacent when 
working with an automated aid (Bahner et al., 2008a). In the 
present experiment the dynamic interplay of these feedback 
loops is investigated by analyzing how subjective trust, 
automation verification behavior, and the probability to 
commit a commission error change with the repeated 
experience that an aid works properly. Furthermore it is of 
interest to what extent the dynamics of these effects are 
dependent on whether or not the operator has ever experienced 
an automation failure before.  
The second question concerns a better understanding 
of why operators sometimes follow a wrong recommendation 
of an automated aid despite seeking out all parameters 
necessary to detect that the aid’s advice was wrong. On first 
sight this might be taken as evidence for discounting 
contradictory information. Yet, a closer inspection of the data 
from Manzey et al. (2008) suggested that at least some of 
these errors were more likely related to a kind of “looking-but-
not-seeing effect”, where operators maintain their usual 
strategies of information sampling but stop to process the 
sampled information attentively. This would reflect a new 
variant of automation bias effect. In the present experiment 
this issue is investigated by analyzing to what extent an 
observed commission error is related to incomplete 
automation verification, to automation verification without 
awareness, or to an active discounting of contradictory cues.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
88 engineering students (65 male, 23 female; mean 
age: 24.05 yrs) participated in the study. Participants were 
paid € 70 for completing the study. 
Apparatus: AutoCAMS 2.0 
A “microworld” simulation of a supervisory process 
control task was used for the experiment (AutoCAMS 2.0, 
Manzey, Bleil, Bahner-Heyne, Klostermann, Onnasch, 
Reichenbach & Röttger, 2008). This system simulates an 
autonomously running life support system of a spacecraft 
consisting of five subsystems that are critical to maintain 
atmospheric conditions in the cabin with respect to different 
parameters (e.g. oxygen, pressure, carbon dioxide). During 
normal operation, all of these parameters are automatically 
kept within target range. However, due to malfunctions in the 
system (e.g. blockage of a valve, defective sensor) parameters 
can go out of range. The primary task of the operator involves 
supervisory control of the subsystems including diagnosis and 
management of system faults. Whenever a fault is detected in 
the system, a master alarm turns on (“red light”). A time 
counter starts displaying how much time has elapsed since the 
occurrence of the fault. In order to have the malfunction fixed, 
its specific cause has to be identified, and an appropriate repair 
order has to be selected from a maintenance menu. The repair 
itself takes 60 seconds; during this time the operator is 
required to control the affected subsystem manually. If the 
repair order sent was correct, the master alarm turns green and 
all subsystems run autonomously again. In case of a wrong 
repair order, the alarm stays red and manual control is required 
until a correct repair is initiated and completed.  
In the present experiment, the operator’s task is 
supported by an automated aid (Automated Fault 
Identification and Recovery Agent, AFIRA). For each 
occurring system fault, AFIRA provides an automatically 
generated diagnosis. Upon confirmation by the operator, it 
executes all steps necessary to manage a given fault and 
initiate an appropriate repair. In order to verify the aid’s 
diagnosis before confirming it, the operator has access to all 
important raw data providing information about the current 
system state. These include tank levels and flow rates for 
oxygen and nitrogen, and a history graph for each of the five 
subsystems. However, this information is not always visible 
but has to be activated for a 10s view by a mouse click on the 
tank, flow meter or history graph, respectively.  
In addition to the primary task, two concurrent 
secondary tasks have to be performed. The first one is a 
prospective memory task in which participants are required to 
check and record the carbon dioxide values every 60 seconds. 
The other one is a simple reaction time task. This task is 
introduced to the participants as a check of a proper 
connection with the spacecraft. Participants have to click on a 
“communication link” icon as fast as possible. This icon 
appears in random intervals roughly twice per minute. 
Design 
The study involved four experimental groups which 
differed with respect to how long they had worked with the aid 
until eventually an automation failure occurred, and whether 
this automation failure was the first or second one the 
participants were exposed to. The time course of events for the 
four different experimental groups is shown in figure 1. 
 
T1 T2 T3 T4
30 min 30 min 30 min 30 min
FC
Exp.Gr. 3
FCF0
Exp.Gr. 4
FC
Exp.Gr. 1
FCF0
Exp.Gr. 2
 
Figure 1: Time course of events for the four experimental groups (FC: critical 
automation failure of the aid at the end of the session for which issues of 
automation bias are observed; F0: automation failure at the beginning of the 
session as part of the experimental treatment) 
 
Participants of the first experimental group worked 
with the aid for one 30 min block before a first automation 
failure occurred. During this time AFIRA provided correct 
diagnoses for five system faults in a row before it eventually 
failed. The second experimental group worked according to an 
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 essentially same schedule with the only difference that the run 
started with a system fault for which the diagnosis provided by 
AFIRA was wrong. A similar variation was realized for 
experimental groups #3 and #4 with the difference that 
participants of these groups worked for a considerably longer 
period (4 blocks / 20 system faults) with the system before the 
critical automation failure at the end of the session occurred. 
Analyses of the relative impact of negative and positive 
experience on trust and automation verification behavior over 
time were based on groups #3 and #4. The analysis of effects 
on automation bias involved all four groups.  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two familiarization and 
practice sessions and one experimental session distributed 
across three different days. The practice session on the first 
day lasted approx. 4 hours and included familiarization and 
practice with the AutoCAMS system. Participants were 
trained to manually, i.e., without automation support, identify 
and manage seven possible faults. On the second day, all 
participants had to perform a 45 min test trial which served to 
test their acquired skills according to a predefined criterion. 
Only the participants who passed this test were accepted to 
participate in the experiment.  
Each experimental session started with an 
introduction to AFIRA. This familiarization included a 
description of the aid’s function as well as a short practice 
trial. During this practice trial AFIRA always provided correct 
diagnoses and recommendations. However, participants were 
informed that the aid’s reliability though being high would not 
be perfect. They were warned to always cross-check the 
proposed diagnoses before confirming it. After this 
introduction the experimental run started. For this run the 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
different experimental groups. Independent of the specific 
experimental group all participants were instructed that the 
whole experiment would include a total of five 30 min blocks. 
This was done in order to assure that all participants worked 
with the same attitude and expectation, and were not able to 
anticipate the real end of the experiment. 
After the automation failure at the end of the session 
(first failure for groups #1 and #3; second failure for groups #2 
and #4), the program stopped as soon as the participant 
decided to either follow the aid’s advice or disagreed with 
AFIRA’s diagnosis. Participants were then asked questions 
about their approach of automation verification. Specifically, 
they had to provide information about which diagnosis had 
been proposed by AFIRA, which parameters they had sampled 
in order to verify the aid’s advice, and what the critical 
relations were between the parameters accessed (the relation 
between parameters provides the critical information needed 
to disambiguate similar system failures). This was done in 
order to check to what extent the participants were aware of 
the steps they had performed and the system information they 
had accessed.  
Ratings of subjective trust in the different 
components of the AutoCAMS system (e.g. oxygen, nitrogen. 
carbon dioxide subsystem) and AFIRA, as well as ratings of 
its reliabilities were collected before each 30 min block and at 
the end of the session.  
Dependent Measures 
Measures used to assess the level of complacency 
included (1) automation verification time (AVT), and (2) 
automation verification information sampling (AVIS). AVT 
was defined as the time interval [s] from the appearance of the 
master warning until confirming or vetoing AFIRA, 
independent of whether this decision was right or wrong. 
AVIS was defined as the percentage of system parameters 
accessed (via mouse click) which were necessary to 
completely verify a given diagnosis provided by AFIRA. Only 
parameters accessed between the occurrence of the master 
warning and conforming or vetoing AFIRA were considered 
for this measure.  
Automation bias was analyzed by the percentage of 
participants committing a commission error, defined as the 
percentage of participants who followed the diagnosis in case 
of an automation failure at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, the underlying determinants of commission errors 
were analyzed by assessing how many participants committing 
a commission error made this error because of 
a) an incomplete automation verification: 
operationally defined like AVIS (see above),  
b) a complete automation verification without 
awareness: number of participants who indeed looked at all 
information needed to verify the aid’s diagnosis but were not 
able to report what they had seen in the SA inquiry,  
c) a discounting of contradictory information: 
number of participants who looked at all necessary parameters 
and were able to report the contradictory information in the 
SA inquiry but nevertheless had followed the wrong diagnosis 
of the aid. 
Subjective trust in the diagnostic function of AFIRA 
was assessed directly by asking the participants how 
trustworthy they thought AFIRA was. Respondents answered 
on a 10-point Likert-type scale ranging from not at all to 
absolutely. 
 
RESULTS 
Subjective Trust in Automation 
Effects of positive and negative experience with AFIRA on 
subjective trust were explored based on data from 
experimental groups #3 and #4. As expected the dynamics of 
trust development in these groups were highly dependent on 
the kind of experience the participants made with the aid. 
Even more important, negative experience with the aid seemed 
to entail much stronger effects on subjective trust than positive 
experience. This becomes evident from the time course of 
effects shown in figure 2. Immediately after familiarization 
and training with AFIRA (block 0), participants of both 
groups showed a comparatively high level of trust in the 
correct functioning of the aid. For participants of group #3 this 
level even increased over the first three blocks as they 
repeatedly made the experience that the aid worked properly. 
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 However, the first experience of an automation failure at the 
end of block #4 led to a sharp decrease of trust in this group, 
down to a level which was even slightly lower than the initial 
trust. A different picture emerged for participants of 
experimental group #4 who were exposed to a first automation 
failure already in the beginning of the experimental session. 
This experience caused a significant and sharp decline of trust 
which was still visible at the end of the first block, despite the 
fact that the aid meanwhile had worked properly again for five 
events. Although trust ratings recovered slowly over the next 
two blocks (10 events) where the aid worked correctly, they 
never reached the level of the other group. After the 
experience of a second failure at the end of block 4, trust 
ratings dropped again considerably, yet less than after the first 
failure. A 2(Groups) x 5(Block) ANOVA of these effects 
revealed significant main effects of Group, F(1,41)=4.62, 
p<.04, and Block, F(4,164)=10.43, p<.001, as well as a 
significant Group x Block interaction,  F(4,164)=5.56, p<.001. 
Figure 2: Time course of subjective trust ratings across experimental blocks 
for participants of experimental groups #3 and #4 (block 0 = subjective trust 
rating after training with the aid)  
Automation Verification 
In order to explore whether the effects seen in 
subjective trust ratings also would be reflected in differences 
in automation verification behavior, it was compared to what 
extent participants of group #3 and #4 sampled all the system 
parameters necessary to cross-check the automatically 
generated diagnosis of AFIRA before confirming it. Only 
events for which AFIRA provided a correct diagnosis were 
considered for this analysis. The effects are shown in figure 3. 
As becomes evident from this figure, the experience of a 
failure of the aid at the beginning of the experimental session 
entailed a significant effect on automation verification (AVIS) 
which persisted over the entire time of the experiment. 
Participants with an early failure experience were significantly 
less complacent in interaction with the aid than participants 
without failure experience. On average they sampled 97.4% of 
the system parameters which were necessary to completely 
verify the aid’s diagnoses. In contrast, participant without 
failure experience only checked 92.0% of the critical 
information. A 2(Group) x 4(Block) ANOVA revealed a 
significant Group effect, F(1,42) = 6.82, p<.02. Neither the 
Block effect, F(3,126)=1.11, nor the Group x Block 
interaction, F(3, 126) < 1, was significant. No significant 
Group effect was found for automation verification time, F<1. 
Figure 3: Time course of automation verification information sampling across 
blocks for participants of experimental groups #3 and #4. 
Automation Bias 
Table 1 provides an overview of the number of 
participants who committed a commission error when the aid 
surprisingly proposed a wrong diagnosis at the end of the 
experimental session. As becomes evident, the risk of this sort 
of automation bias was considerably higher for the group of 
participants who did not have prior experience of an aid’s 
failure. In this case 20.4% of the participants committed a 
commission error. This contrasted to a significantly lower 
error rate (4.5%) for participants who were already exposed to 
a first failure of the aid at the beginning of their session, 
χ
2(1)=5.10, p<.03. Somewhat contrary to expectations, the 
number of valid diagnoses prior to the automation failure did 
not entail any significant effects on automation bias, χ2<1.  
 
Table 1: Number (percentage) of participants who committed a commission 
error when the aid failed at the end of the session.   
 
N of correct diagnoses prior 
to the false diagnosis Prior experience of 
a false diagnosis 5 20 
Total 
No 6 (27.3%) 3 (13.6%) 9 (20.4%) 
Yes 0 (0%) 2 (9.1%) 2 (4.5%) 
Total 6 (13.6%) 5 (11.4%)  
 
Micro analyses of Commission Errors  
Out of the 11 participants who followed the wrong 
automation advice at the end of the experiment, only six could 
be classified as being complacent in a “classical” sense, as 
they made the commission error because they did not check all 
the information that would have been necessary to verify the 
correctness of the aid. The other five participants followed the 
wrong automation advice despite checking all parameters that 
were necessary to realize that the automatically generated 
diagnosis was wrong. However, four of these participants 
seemed to have conducted these cross-checks without or with 
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 less attention. This was revealed by the results of the 
questionnaire that was administered after they had falsely 
confirmed the aid’s diagnosis. Although all five participants in 
fact had checked all necessary system information to verify 
the aid’s diagnosis, four of them were not able to recall 
correctly what they had seen. Three of these participants stated 
that the nitrogen flow they had checked was on standard level 
although it actually was much lower which is an indicator for 
a specific system fault. Another participant was not able to 
recall a critical relation between two parameters even though 
the logfile revealed that he had looked at both. Only one of the 
eleven participants committed the error despite being aware of 
all the contradictory system information. However, he failed 
to give a clear reason for this decision. In contrast, out of the 
77 participants who had correctly identified the aid’s wrong 
diagnosis only 4 were not able to recall all necessary 
parameters which they had cross-checked before. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the present study was to investigate to 
what extent positive and negative experience in interaction 
with an automated aid determine the level of trust, the degree 
of automation verification (i.e. complacency), and the strength 
of automation bias in terms of commission errors. Another 
study objective aimed at a better understanding of the 
proposed “looking-but-not-seeing effect” as a possible cause 
of commission errors. In this regard, four main conclusions 
can be drawn from the results. 
(1) The assumption that two feedback loops interact 
dynamically in determining the subjective level of trust could 
be confirmed. However, the strength of these loops seems to 
be considerably different. This is suggested by the different 
time courses of trust effects induced by positive and negative 
experience. About 20 repeated positive experience were 
needed to completely compensate for a decline of trust 
induced by a single automation failure that occurred early in 
time during working with the aid. This is in line with earlier 
results of Lee and Moray (1992) who have studied the 
dynamics of trust development in a supervisory control task. 
(2) The two proposed feedback loops also determined 
the level of complacency and risk of commission errors in 
interaction with the automated aid. Participants who had 
already made the experience of an automation failure turned 
out to be less complacent and less prone to commit a 
commission error when the aid failed a second time. This 
confirms similar results reported by Bahner et al. (2008a) and 
suggests that direct experience of automation failures may 
provide an effective countermeasure for complacency and 
automation bias effects. 
(3) Whereas the effects of a single automation failure 
on subjective trust seem to recover (albeit slowly) over time if 
the aid works properly again afterwards, a similar effect was 
not observed for automation verification information sampling 
behavior. Regaining the initial trust level was not reflected in 
the participants’ cross-checking behavior which persisted at a 
nearly perfect level and thereby reduced the probability of a 
commission error. This suggests that the impact of the 
negative feedback loop is more enduring on the behavioral 
level than on the subjective trust level.  
(4) One of the most interesting aspects extracted from 
the present study is the idea of different causes for automation 
bias. Only half of the participants committing a commission 
error behaved complacent in a “classical” sense, i.e., they did 
not check all necessary information needed to verify the aid’s 
recommendation. The other half of the participants actually 
checked all relevant information needed to identify the wrong 
diagnosis but, nevertheless, followed the incorrect advice. 
However, only one of these participants could correctly report 
what the system parameters indicated. It seems therefore, that 
automation bias can be associated with three different effects, 
(a) a withdrawal of attention in terms of incomplete cross-
checks of information, (b) an active discounting of 
contradictory information, and (c) an inattentive processing of 
the contradictory information analogue to a “looking-but-not-
seeing effect”. The latter effect is in line with earlier results 
from automation monitoring (e.g. Duley, Westerman, Molloy 
& Parasuraman, 1997) and enlarges the set of causes of 
automation bias.  
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